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Abstract
We analyse the term structure of interest rates in a general equilibrium model with incom-
plete markets, borrowing constraint, and positive net supply of government bonds. Uninsured
idiosyncratic shocks generate bond trades, while aggregate shocks cause uctuations in the
trading price of bonds. Long bonds command a liquidation risk premiumover short bonds,
because they may have to be liquidated before maturity following a bad idiosyncratic shock
precisely when their resale value is low due to the simultaneous occurrence of a bad aggre-
gate shock. Our framework endogenously generates limited cross-sectional wealth heterogeneity
among the agents (despite the presence of uninsured idiosyncratic shocks), which allows us to
characterise analytically the shape of the entire yield curve, including the yields on bonds of
arbitrarily long maturities. Agentsdesire to hedge the idiosyncratic risk together with their
fear of having to liquidate long bonds at unfavourable terms imply that a greater bond supply
raises the level of the yield curve, while an increase in the relative supply of long bonds raises
its slope.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyses the term structure of real interest rates in an innite-horizon, general equilib-
rium framework in which agents are hit by aggregate shocks, as well as idiosyncratic shocks that
cannot be fully insured due to incomplete markets and borrowing constraint. On the one hand,
uninsured idiosyncratic shocks generate bond trades as traders willing to buy bonds for precau-
tionary purposes purchase them from traders willing to sell to bu¤er the shocks. On the other
hand, aggregate shocks cause uctuations in bond prices, and hence induce some volatility in the
terms at which bond trades take place.
The key novelty of our approach is the construction of a tractable equilibrium allowing for
an analytical characterisation of the entire yield curve (from one-period to arbitrarily long bonds),
while accomodating active trades of positive net bond supplies at all maturities. Tractability follows
from two main underlying assumptions, which jointly ensure that the model generates a nite-
dimensional cross-sectional distribution of wealth as an equilibrium outcome.1 The rst assumption
is that agentsinstant utility is separable in consumption and labour and linear in labour (as in,
e.g., Scheinkmann and Weiss (1986)). As we show, endogenous labour supply with quasi-linear
preferences implies that agents entering the good idiosyncratic state (employment) are willing
to work as much as necessary to instantaneously replete their bond portfolio; in consequence,
bond holdings are homogeneous across agents in that state and independent of their history of
idiosyncratic states. The second assumption is that equilibrium bond holdings are su¢ ciently small
for agents entering the bad idiosyncratic state (unemployment) to be willing to liquidate their
asset wealth in a small number of periods. The reason is that, under transitory idiosyncratic shocks,
agents in the bad idiosyncratic state may be willing to borrow against future income, in which case
they hit the borrowing constraint. Agents in this situation simply liquidate their bond portfolio
and, by way of consequence, no longer a¤ect bond prices. We focus on the equilibria with full
asset liquidation, where small equilibrium bond holdings in the rst place ensures that agents
immediately face a binding borrowing constraint when hit by a bad idiosyncratic shock.2
The theoretical investigation of the model shows that, in this framework i) a higher net supply
of government bonds of any maturity nanced by lump-sum taxesraises the level of the entire
yield curve; ii) a higher net supply of long bonds raises the slope of the yield curve where we
dene the slope as the yield di¤erence between the two ends of the curve.3 The rst e¤ect
(on the level of the curve) can be seen as a generalisation to the full set of bond maturities of a
1This is in contrast with most incomplete market economies, where any agents wealth depends on his entire own
history of idiosyncratic shocks, so that innitely many agent types ultimately coexist in the economy. Such models
must be solved numerically and can accomodate only a small number of assets, typically one or two (e.g., Den Haan
(1996), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Krusell and Smith (1997), Heathcote (2005)).
2 In the separate technical appendix to the paper, we study numerically a relaxed model wherein asset liquidation
is gradual rather than immediate, and conrm all the results obtained in the case of instantaneous asset liquidation.
3Empirically, Laubach (2009) reports that higher levels of public debt or larger scal decits signicantly raise real
interest rates. Relatedly, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) show that the size of public debt negatively
a¤ects the spread between corporate and Treasury bond yields, a reection of the presence of a Treasury demand
function. The work of Engen and Hubbard (2005), Gale and Orszag (2003) and Longsta¤ (2004) point toward a
similar relationship.
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common implication of non-Ricardian economies, according to which an increase in the supply of
assets available for self-insurance lowers the price of such assets and raises their expected return.4
The identication of the second e¤ect (on the slope of the yield curve) is our central substantive
result and can be explained as follows. Under aggregate and uninsured idiosyncratic shocks, holders
of long bonds are exposed to a specic source of risk, namely, that of having to sell bonds due to
the occurrence of a bad idiosyncratic shocksprecisely at a time when the resale value of bonds
is low because the aggregate state is itself unfavourable. Decreasing marginal utility implies that
the utility loss incurred when selling at a low price is not compensated by the potential benet
from selling bonds at high prices. More formally, the source of risk that we identify results from
the covariance between the resale price of long bonds and bondholderswealth. Under incomplete
insurance and active trading, bondholderswealth explicitly enters future marginal utility, because
it determines what consumption can be achieved, should part or all of their bond wealth be liqui-
dated (after a bad idiosyncratic shock). In this case, the combination of aggregate and uninsured
idiosyncratic shocks generates negative co-movements between bondholderspricing kernel and the
trading price of long bonds, which consequently depresses their average prices i.e., it raises their
average yields. These co-movements being driven by the trading price of bonds, they are present
even if the bondsown income is riskless, as we assume it to be (by considering zero-coupon bonds
paying a certain terminal payo¤). In contrast to long bonds, one-period bonds are never resold,
implying no such co-movements and no such risk. We refer to the risk of having to liquidate long
bonds at uncertain future resale prices as liquidation risk, and to the associated yield premium as
the liquidation risk premium. By linking the yield premium on long bonds to the degree of certainty
at which bonds of di¤erent maturities can be converted into consumption, our model provides a
possible foundation for the notion that investors prefer short to long bonds because the former are
more liquidthan the latter.
Under which conditions do long yields incorporate a liquidation risk premium, and how does the
latter vary with the net supply of bonds? Trivially, there is no liquidation risk without aggregate
shocks, since in this case all bond prices are constant and hence do not covary with bondholders
wealth. Similarly, there is no such risk under complete markets, because full risk sharing implies
that agents never have to sell bonds after a bad idiosyncratic shock. More subtly, when markets are
incomplete but the equilibrium features no trade a popular specication5, bond prices and yields
typically di¤er from their complete-market counterparts, but again agents never actually rebalance
their portfolio (by the no-trade property) and hence no liquidation risk is present. It follows that
aggregate risk, uninsured idiosyncratic risk and positive net supplies of long bonds are all needed
for the liquidation risk premium to kick in. Under these conditions, the greater the supply of long
bonds, the greater the (negative) covariance between bondholderspricing kernel and the resale
price of long bonds, and the greater the liquidation risk premium that these bonds command.
4For example, the level e¤ect on interest rates is a standard property of overlapping-models, which we discuss
further in the literature review below.
5Constantinides and Du¢ e (1996), and more recently Krusell et al. (2011) analyse equilibrium asset prices in the
no-trade equilibria of incomplete-market economies. We return to these contributions in the literature review below.
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In order to best disentangle the respective roles of aggregate risk, idiosyncratic risk and bond
supplies in a¤ecting the shape of the yield curve, we proceed gradually as follows. We rst char-
acterise the yield curve in a complete-market version of our model, where the demand for bonds
is only driven by the representative agents desire to hedge the aggregate risk. We notably verify
that the yield curve is well behavedin this scenario and, in particular, that it is consistent with
Ricardian equivalence in that the yield curve is independent of the net supply of bonds. Starting
from this benchmark, we study how the shape of the yield curve changes when insurance markets
against the idiosyncratic risk are shut down, while bonds of all maturities are kept in zero net
supply. Because private agents cannot themselves have negative asset wealth (by assumption), the
outcome is a no-trade equilibrium wherein agentsdemands for bonds are driven by their desire
to hedge the aggregate risk and the idiosyncratic risk (with bond prices adjusting up to the point
where net demands are all equal to zero). This environment shows that the two hedging motives
for holding bonds interact in a nontrivial way, and typically a¤ect the two ends of the yield curve
di¤erently.6 Finally, starting from this incomplete-market, zero-net-supply case, we analyse how
a gradual increase in bond supplies alters the shape of the yield curve, leading to the level and
slope e¤ects discussed above. For each of these environments (complete markets, incomplete mar-
kets/zero net supply, incomplete markets/positive net supply), we show how changes in the deep
parameters of the model a¤ect the level and the volatility of the pricing kernel that determines
all bond prices. In particular, for the two cases where markets are incomplete, we structure our
discussion around a factorisation of the pricing kernel in the spirit of Constantinides and Du¢ e
(1996) and Krueger and Lustig (2010), which allows us to disentangle how the two hedging motives
interact and ultimately a¤ect the shape of the curve. In all three specications, we also derive
explicit formulas for the long and the average short yield in the case of small, i.i.d. aggregate
shocks, where the various e¤ects at work on those yields are perfectly transparent.
In what follows, we rst discuss the related literature (Section 2), then introduce our model
(Section 3), and nally analyse the shape of the yield curve under the three congurations just
discussed (Section 4). We conclude the paper with a brief summary of our results (Section 5).
2 Related literature
Because of their inherently non-Ricardian nature, overlapping generations (OLG) models have
frequently been used to study the e¤ect of scal policy on the real yield curve. For example,
even simple OLG models with two or three-period lived agents typically have the property that
increasing the stock of government bonds can raise the equilibrium interest rate when agents are
constrained by the supply of stores of value in the economy (Barro (1974)). Our framework and
results di¤er from such simple OLG models in the following respects. First, these models are
useful for analysing the long-run, demographic determinants of the yield curve (see, e.g., Guibaud,
6 In particular, we show that time-variations in idiosyncratic risk can in itself raise the term premium (even under
zero net bond supply), in the same vein as Mankiw (1986) showed that it could raise the equity premium.
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Nosbusch and Vayanos (2013)); however, they are arguably ill-suited for capturing the bond price
risk that occurs at the much shorter business cycle frequency, and on which our analysis focuses.
Second, there is no continuity between such simple OLG models and the frictionless, Ricardian
benchmark, so that the degree of departure from the latter environnement cannot be perfectly
controlled; in contrast, our framework nests both the Ricardian model and a version of the simple
OLG model as special cases.7 On the other hand,perpetual youthmodel of the kind studied
by Blanchard (1985), Weil (1989) and more recently Gârleanu and Panageas (2012), retain the
tractability of simple OLG models and do nest the Ricardian benchmark (when the birth and
death rates are both set to zero). However, there is no liquidiation risk in these models, because
agents never have to liquidate their portolio to provide for current consumption (instead wealth is
either kept for ever as in Weil, or seized at death and redistributed to the living according to an
actuarially fair life insurance scheme as in Blanchard). Finally, while nite-life, multi-period OLG
models have realistic time scales and can in principle allow for random liquidation before death,
they typically cannot be solved in closed form and thus the number of assets under scrutiny must
remain small (e.g., Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007), Gomes and Michaelides (2008)).
The idea that uninsured idiosyncratic risk can help explain asset-pricing puzzles was rst ex-
plored in nite-horizon economies. Following the lead of Mankiw (1986) and Weil (1992), who
focused on stock returns, Heaton and Lucas (1992), and more recently Holmström and Tirole
(2001), have used three-period models to analyse the e¤ects of the interactions between idiosyn-
cratic and aggregate risks on the yield curve. These models provide important insights into these
interactions, and usually allow for positive asset supplies and active trades among heterogenous
agents; however, they leave open the question of how they a¤ect the yield curve over a long horizon.
There is a key class of innite-horizon, incomplete-market models where analytical expressions
for the price of long assets can be obtained: those where the no-trade equilibrium prevails. Such
is the case in Constantinides and Du¢ es (1996) model of the equity premium, where the no-trade
property follows from the fact that idiosyncratic shocks are permanent. A more recent contribution
is Krusell, Mukoyama, and Smith (2011), who study asset prices in the autarkic equilibrium of an
incomplete-market model with transitory idiosyncratic shocks. In their model agents value assets
(including bonds of di¤erent maturities) for their ability to transfer wealth across periods and
smooth out idiosyncratic income shocks, but do not trade in equilibrium. In contrast, since our
focus is on how the quantity of assets available in the market allows this intertemporal smoothing
to take place, and thereby a¤ects the desirability and equilibrium price of bonds, our results require
active trading of positive net bond quantities following idiosyncratic shocks.
As discussed by Kehoe and Levine (2001), there are two main classes of innite-horizon economies
with limited risk-sharing: liquidity-constrained economies which, like ours, feature incomplete
markets and, typically, an exogenous debt limit; and debt-constrained economies, which have
7To be more specic: our model becomes a frictionless, representative-agent economy when the probability to be
hit by a bad idiosyncratic shock is set to zero, and is observationally equivalent to a version of the OLG model with
two period lived agents when this probability is set to one.
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complete markets but an endogenous debt limit in that agents can only borrow up to the point
where they will be willing to repay (rather than revert to autarky). Following Kehoe and Levine
(1993) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Seppälä (2004) studies the yield curve in a debt-constrained
economy where the debt limit varies endogenously over time, and shows numerically that this frame-
work generates time-varying term premia.8 There are at least two important di¤erences between
his approach and ours. First, he does not analyse the impact of the volume and maturity struc-
ture of public debt on the shape of the yield curve, which is the main focus of our paper. And
second, we combine borrowing constraint and incomplete insurance against idiosyncratic shocks,
which leads us to emphasise the liquidity role played by government bonds (a notion that is absent
from debt-constrained economies) and the way it generates supply e¤ects on the shape of the yield
curve.
In a recent line of research, Vayanos and Vila (2009), and Greenwood and Vayanos (2010)
formalise the notion of preferred habitat in an environment with limited arbitrage. They use
a partial equilibrium model wherein some investors have a preference for specic maturities, and
analyse how exogenous variations in the short rate are transmitted to long rates by arbitrageurs.
There are at least two important di¤erences between their approach and ours. First, their frame-
work does not allow studying the impact of public debt on the level of the yield curve (as opposed
to its slope), since short rates are exogenous; in contrast, we are interested in how public debt
a¤ects the whole curve, including its short end. Second, all agents are utility-maximising in our
framework, so that investorspreference for some maturities and the sensitivity of the yield curve
to the maturity structure of the debt are both endogenously determined by agentspricing kernel.
In order to organise their empirical ndings, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) de-
velop a theoretical model of liquidity demand that generates a downward-sloping demand for gov-
ernment bonds, as does our model. The key di¤erence between their approach and ours is that
their aggregate demand for liquidity is based on the assumption that government bonds directly
enter agentsutility, while our model provides a foundation for the liquidity motive for holding
bonds based on nancial frictions.
Finally, a popular approach in interest rate modelling is to assume the absence of arbitrage and
directly considers an exogenous pricing kernel to price bonds of various maturities (see Dai and
Singleton (2006) for an overview). Some recent papers following this tradition introduce macro-
economic factors as determinants of the pricing kernel (see Ang and Piazzesi (2003) on monetary
policy, and Dai and Philippon (2006) on scal policy). In contrast, we build a general equilib-
rium model with utility-maximizing agents where the pricing kernel is endogenously determined by
agentsutility function together with the nancial frictions they face.
8 In the separate technical appendix to this paper, we show that our framework also generates time-varying risk
premia, so that the Expectations Hypothesis does not hold. Krueger and Perri (2011) study scal policy in a debt-
constrained economy, but do not introduce public debt nor study the shape of the yield curve.
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3 The model
We consider a discrete-time economy with a single consumption good and populated by a con-
tinuum I = [0; 1] of innitely-lived agents who face two sources of risk: an aggregate shock that
a¤ects the productivity of employed agents as well as the probability to be employed (Section 3.1);
and an uninsurable individual shock that causes households to switch idiosyncratically between
employment and unemployment (Section 3.2). The government issues and rolls over positive stocks
of zero-coupon bonds of di¤erent maturities, and adjust taxes so as to maintain a given maturity
structure of the debt (Section 3.3). Agents optimally hold and trade these bonds, in part to self-
insure against the income variability induced by changes in their employment status (Section 3.4).
In equilibrium, the supply of bonds of each maturity must be equal to the economywide demands
for each maturity by heterogeneous agents (Section 3.5).
3.1 Aggregate states
The economy is characterized at every date t = 0; 1; : : : by an aggregate state st, where st = h if
this state is highand st = l if it is low. Let st = fs0; : : : ; stg denote the history of aggregate
states from date 0 to date t and St the set of all possible histories. The aggregate state evolves
according to a rst-order Markov chain with transition matrix
T =
"
h 1  h
1  l l
#
: (1)
We denote by h   1  l =  2  l   h and l  1  h the unconditional fractions of time
spent in state h and l, respectively. We also make the following assumption:9
Assumption A (Persistence of aggregate state). h + l  1.
While not necessary for most of our results, Assumption A allows us to focus our analysis on the
empirically relevant case where conditional yield curves are monotonic in both states of the world
(see Section 4 below). Without this assumption the yield curve may be oscillating in either state
or both, a feature that is not observed in the data.10 We assume that the probability distribution
across aggregate states at date 0 is

l; h

, and we denote by t : St ! [0; 1] (t = 0; 1; : : :) the
probability measure over aggregate histories up to date t, consistent with the transition matrix T
and the initial distribution.
9 In what follows, the assumptions we make start holding as soon as they are stated.
10This assumption is also supported by direct evidence from estimated empirical Markov-switching business cycle
models. For example, Hamilton ((1994), chap. 22) nds h+l = 1:65 at a quarterly frequency for the US economy.
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3.2 Individual states
In every period, each agent can be in either of two states, employed or  unemployed. Let
eit denote the employment status of agent i at date t, where e
i
t = 1 if the agent is employed and
eit = 0 if the agent is unemployed. Denote by t
 
st

: St ! [0; 1]; t = 0; 1; : : : the probability
for an agent to be employed at date t when he or she was employed at date t  1 and the history
of the aggregate shock is st 2 St, i.e., t
 
st
  Pr(eit = 1 eit 1 = 1; st). Similarly, denote by
t : S
t ! [0; 1]; t = 0; 1; : : : the probability for an agent who was unemployed at date t  1 to stay
unemployed at date t, i.e., t
 
st
  Pr(eit = 0 eit 1 = 0; st). The implied transition matrix across
employment statuses is
t
 
st

=
"
t
 
st

1  t
 
st

1  t
 
st

t
 
st
 # :
All idiosyncratic changes in employment statuses are independent across agents and the law of
large number holds on the continuum of agents. The history of individual shocks up to date t is
denoted by ei;t, where ei;t = fei0; : : : ; eitg 2 f0; 1gt = Et. Et is the set of all possible individual
histories up to date t, and it : E
t ! [0; 1] denotes the probability measure of individual histories,
consistent with the transition matrix t and an initial probability distribution !0. For example,
it
 
ei;t

is the probability that agent i has experienced the individual history ei;t up to date t.
The individual and aggregate states a¤ect the economy as follows. Employed agents (for whom
eit = 1) freely choose their labour supply and produce z
st units of the (single) consumption good
per unit of labour supplied in state st = h; l, with zh  zl > 0.1112 Unemployed agents (for whom
eit = 0) get a xed home productionincome  > 0. We now make the following assumptions:
Assumption B (Productivity and idiosyncratic risk). (i) 1=zl < u0 () ; (ii) h  l and h  l.
Point (i), combined with the fact that zh  zl, will imply that in equilibrium the employed will
e¤ectively consume more (and hence enjoy lower marginal utility) than the unemployed in both
aggregate states that is, the equilibrium will feature imperfect consumption insurance. Point (ii)
states that aggregate state h, which is associated with a relatively high labour productivity for the
employed, is not associated with a greater probability of facing a bad idiosyncratic shock (i.e., the
probability of falling into unemployment, 1  s, or to stay unemployed, s).13
11Hence, employed agents are self-employed here. This specication is formally similar to one in which employed
agents supply labour in a competitive labour market and interact with rms endowed with the constant-return-to-
scale production function yst = zst l. Then, in equilibrium rms make no prot and employed agentsearn a wage
equal to the marginal product of labour, zst .
12Many authors, ranging from Mehra and Prescott (1985) to Alvarez and Jermann (2000), have analysed endowment
economies that are stationary in growth rates, rather than in levels as we do. We adopt the level specication because
our economy is a production one with endogenous labour supply and a period utility functional that is separable
in consumption and leisure. In this context, stationarity in the growth rate of labour productivity is inconsistent
with balanced growth, except for the somewhat specic case where the utility of consumption is logarithmic. In the
separate technical appendix to the paper we analyse a growth-stationary variant of the model with log consumption
utility that retains the main properties of our baseline level-stationary model.
13 In short, this assumes that unemployment risk does not rise in a boom. Note that even in the case where
8
The date 0 distribution of agents over employment statuses is represented by a row vector
!0 = [!
e
0 !
u
0 ], where !
e
0 (!
u
0) is the share of employed (unemployed) agents and !
e
0 + !
u
0 = 1. The
laws of motion for the shares of employed and unemployed agents are given by, respectively,
!et (s
t) = t(s
t)!et 1(s
t 1) +
 
1  t(st)

!ut 1(s
t 1); (2)
!ut (s
t) =
 
1  t(st)

!et 1(s
t 1) + t(s
t)!ut 1(s
t 1): (3)
3.3 Government
The government issues and rolls over riskless, zero-coupon bonds of various maturities that pay o¤
one unit of the good at maturity. Bond maturities vary from 1 to n  1, where n may be arbitrarily
large. A bond of maturity k > 1 at date t becomes a bond of maturity k   1 at date t + 1, and
eventually yields one unit of the consumption good at date t+ k. The date t price of this bond in
terms of the consumption good is pt;k(st), and we dene the price of a bond of maturity 0 by its
payo¤, i.e., pt;0(st) = 1. The yield-to-maturity of a bond with maturity k = 1; : : : ; n in history st
is dened by the usual logarithmic expression, i.e., rt;k(st) =  k 1 ln pt;k(st).
There is no public consumption, so government outlays exactly equal the total payo¤ owed to
the holders of bonds that are reaching maturity. At any date t, bonds issued at dates t 1, t 2,. . . ,
t  n with respective maturities 1, 2,. . . , n reach maturity. Bond payo¤s are nanced by both new
bond issues and taxes. More specically, at every date t, a quantity At;k
 
st

of bonds paying 1
at date t + k is issued at price pt;k(st), while a lump-sum tax on all employed agents,  t
 
st

, is
collected. Hence, the government budget constraint is:
nX
k=1
pt;k
 
st

At;k
 
st

+ !et
 
st

 t
 
st

=
nX
k=1
At k;k
 
st 1

: (4)
We restrict our attention to the case where the government issues the same quantity of k-period
bonds in every period (i.e. At;k
 
st

= Ak; 8t  0), which implies that the overall quantity of bonds
Bk of a given maturity k is also constant (i.e. Bk =
Pn k
j=0 Ak+j , for any k  1). The quantity Bk
is composed of newly issued bonds of maturity k and of bonds issued earlier and coming closer to
maturity. The lump sum tax paid by employed agents adjusts endogenously to satisfy (4) and is
given by
 t(s
t) =
1
!et (s
t)
nX
k=1
 
pt;k 1(st)  pt;k(st)

Bk; (5)
As will become clear below, positing that only the employed are taxed in our baseline speci-
cation allows us to better isolate the liquidation risk premium on long bonds in the theoretical
part of the paper. As we establish formally in the separate technical appendix, the e¤ect of bond
volumes on the yield curve are similar when the unemployed are also taxed.
transition rates are constant (i.e., s =  and s =  for s = l; h) there will be some (procyclical) variations in
idiosyncratic risk, because the labour income of the unemployed () will be less cyclical than that of the employed.
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3.4 Agentsbehaviour
Each agent i 2 I has preferences over consumption and labour that are described by the subjective
discount factor  2 (0; 1) and the instant utility function u (c)  l, where c is consumption, l labour
supply and u is a C2 function satisfying u0 (:) > 0, and u00 (:) < 0 (this follows Scheinkmann and
Weiss (1986)). Asset markets are incomplete, in that zero-coupon government bonds are the only
assets that agents can trade. This implies that, rst, there is no asset providing a payo¤ contingent
on agentsidiosyncratic employment status (i.e., unemployment risk is uninsurable); and second,
no agent can have negative asset wealth at any point in time.14 We denote the quantity of k-period
bonds held by agent i at the end of period t by bit;k, and the corresponding bond holdings at the
beginning of period 0 by bi 1;k (specic assumptions about initial bond holdings will be made later
on to avoid uninteresting transitory dynamics). Agent is problem consists of choosing the sequences
of consumption cit(s
t; ei;t), labour supply lit(s
t; ei;t), and bond holdings (bit;k(s
t; ei;t))1kn, dened
over St  Et to maximize expected intertemporal utility. From now on, we simplify notations by
omitting the references to st and ei;t when no ambiguity arises. Agent i solves:
max
fci;li;big
Ei0
1X
t=0
t
 
u
 
cit
  lit (6)
s.t. cit +  te
i
t +
nX
k=1
pt;k b
i
t;k =
nX
k=1
pt;k 1 bit 1;k + e
i
tztl
i
t +
 
1  eit

; (7)
bit;k  0, k = 1; : : : ; n; (8)
cit; l
i
t  0; (9)
lim
t!1
tu0
 
cit

bit;k = 0; for k = 1; : : : ; n; (10)
bi 1;k  0, k = 1; : : : ; n given. (11)
Equation (7) is agent is budget constraint at date t: total wealth is made of the value of the
bond portfolio inherited from last periods bond purchases, as well as wage income if the agent is
employed (i.e., eit = 1) or home production income if the agent is unemployed (i.e., e
i
t = 0); this
wealth is used to purchase consumption goods, buy (or hold on to) bonds of various maturity, and
pay taxes (if eit = 1). The inequalities in (8) reect the fact that private agents cannot issue bonds.
Alternatively, one could consider a relaxed form of the borrowing constraint whereby nonnegativity
would apply to total individual wealth
Pn
k=1 pt;k b
i
t;k, rather than to every single bond as in (8).
This would not alter our results, as we discuss further in Section 4.3 below.
Conditions (9) and (10) are the non-negativity and transversality conditions which are always
satised in the equilibrium we consider, and (11) is the agents initial bond holdings.
Let ('it;k)k=1;:::;n be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the borrowing constraints in (8).
These multipliers are positive functions dened over StEt. The rst-order conditions associated
14These properties are central in the literature on liquidity-constrained economies since the seminal work of Bewley
(1980). See also Kehoe and Levine (2001), and the references therein.
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with the agents program (6)(10) are, for k = 1; :::n:(
u0
 
cit

= 1=zt if eit = 1;
lit = 0 if e
i
t = 0;
(12)
u0
 
cit

pt;k = Et

u0
 
cit+1

pt+1;k 1

+ 'it;k: (13)
Equation (12) describes the agents optimal labour supply. On the one hand, unemployed
agents (i.e., for whom eit = 0) do not supply labour. On the other hand, by the quasi-linearity of
preferences, employed agents (i.e., for whom eit = 1) work up to the point where their marginal
utility of consumption (also equal to the marginal utility of wealth) is equal to 1=zt. As will
become clear in Section 4.3 below, this will in turn imply that consumption and bond holdings are
identical across employed agents and hence independent of their history of idiosyncratic states.
The Euler equation (13) sets the marginal cost of acquiring one unit of k-period bonds at date t
equal to the marginal gain associated with its payo¤ at the next date. When the shadow cost of the
borrowing constraint is positive, meaning that the constraint is binding ('it;k > 0), agent i would
like to increase current consumption by issuing k-period bonds (but is prevented from doing so by
assumption).
3.5 Market clearing and equilibrium
We denote by t : (R+)nE ! [0; 1] the probability measure describing the distribution of agents
across individual wealth (made of bonds of various maturities) and employment status in period
t. For example, t (b1; : : : ; bn; 1) denotes the measure of agents who are employed (eit = 1) and
hold a bond portfolio b1; : : : ; bn. This measure depends on the history of shocks and the initial
distribution of agents, denoted 0. The market-clearing conditions set the aggregate demand for
bonds of each maturity equal to their exogenous supply, i.e.,Z
(b1;:::;bk;:::;bn;e)2(R+)nE
bk;t dt (b1; : : : ; bk; : : : ; bn; e) = Bk; 8k = 1; : : : ; n: (14)
By Walras Law, the goods market clears when all bond markets clear.
Denition 1 (Equilibrium). For an initial distribution of bond holdings (bi 1;k)k=1;:::;n and em-
ployment status 0, an equilibrium consists of individual choices fcit; (bit;k)k=1;:::;n; litgt=0;:::;1 and
bond prices fpt;kgk=1;:::;n;t=0;:::;1 such that:
1. Given prices, individual choices solve the agentsprogram (i.e., equations (6) to (10) hold);
2. t evolves consistently with individual choices and the transition matrices for individual and
aggregate states;
3. All bond markets clear at all dates (i.e., equation (14) holds).
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4 Uninsured idiosyncratic risk, relative bond supplies, and the
shape of the yield curve
This section investigates theoretically the impact of the supply of government bonds on the yield
curve in our incomplete-market environment. In order to properly disentangle all the relevant
e¤ects at work, we proceed gradually by analysing three specications of our framework. First, we
characterise the yield curve with complete markets (Section 4.1). Second, we shut down insurance
markets and study how the idiosyncratic risk a¤ects the shape of the yield curve when bonds are in
zero net supply and hence no bond trades take place in equilibrium (Section 4.2). Finally, we show
how the yield curve is a¤ected under incomplete markets when agents trade positive net supplies
of bonds (Section 4.3).
In all three economies, we focus on the equilibrium where bond prices only depend on the
realisation of the current aggregate shock. From the literature on asset pricing with nite state-
space (e.g., Mehra and Prescott (1985)), we conjecture (and verify) that bond prices at any date t
only depend on the current aggregate state st; and not on the entire history st, i.e., pt;k(st) = pt;k;
and we simply note psk the price of a k maturity bond in state s 2 fh; lg. This price structure
entails a form of stationarity, since bond prices depend only on their maturity and the current
aggregate state.15 In consequence, there are two conditional yield curves (one for each value of
the aggregate state). To simplify the exposition, we keep the notation pt;k instead of psk, when
no ambiguity arises. The average (or unconditional) yield curve (rk)k=1;:::;n is the weighted sum
of conditional yields, where the weights are the unconditional frequencies of each aggregate state:
rk  hrhk + lrlk.
4.1 Complete markets
This section characterises the yield curve when insurance markets are complete for the idiosyncratic
risk. In this situation, equation (12) implies that all agents have the same marginal utility of
consumption at date t, i.e., u0
 
cit

= 1=zt for all i. Then, from (13), bond prices satisfy for all
k = 1; : : : ; n:
pt;k = Et

mCMt+1 pt+1;k 1

= Et
24 kY
j=1
mCMt+j
35 ; where mCMt+1 =  ztzt+1 (15)
is the agentspricing kernel at date t+ 1. Iterating (15) forward, we nd that pt;k = kEt [zt=zt+k],
so the yield-to-maturity at date t of a bond with maturity k is:
rCMt;k =   ln() 
1
k
 
ln
 
Et

z 1t+k
  ln(z 1t ) : (16)
15This stationarity is straightforward in both the complete-market and the incomplete market/zero net supply
specications. As we discuss further in Section 4.3 and Appendix D, in the incomplete market/positive net supply
case it is tied to the limited cross-sectional heterogeneity that makes our analysis tractable.
12
The rst term   ln is simply the level of the interest rate without aggregate risk. The term
  ln  Et z 1t+k  ln(z 1t ) is the di¤erence, expressed in terms of log-marginal utility, between the
cost of purchasing the bond in the current period (ln(z 1t ) and its payo¤ at maturity, ln
 
Et

z 1t+k

.
This di¤erence reects the key motive for holding a k-period bond in the representative-agent frame-
work, namely, that of smoothing consumption between date t and date t+ k. The terminal payo¤
(=1) occurs once in the bond lifetime, no matter the maturity of the bond. The yield premium
 k 1  ln  Et z 1t+k  ln(z 1t ) is therefore spread over the maturity of the bond and decreases (in
absolute value) as the maturity of the bond rises to eventually vanish at very long maturities.
The property that aggregate risk a¤ects short yields more than long yields will also be true in the
incomplete-market environment studied below, for the same reason (although bondholderspricing
kernel and hence bond yields will of course di¤er from that in the complete-market case). The
next proposition summarises the key properties of the yield curve under complete markets, and a
discussion follows (all proofs are in the Appendix).16
Proposition 1 (Complete-market yield curves). With complete markets,
1. Yields in both aggregate states converge towards a common limit rCM1 =   ln > 0 as k !
+1.
2. The yield curve in aggregate state h (l) lies below (above) rCM1 and is strictly increasing
(decreasing) in k.
3. The average yield curve lies below rCM1 and is strictly increasing in k
Part 1 of the proposition states that in the limit the long-run (i.e., innite-maturity) yield on
zero-coupon bonds with aggregate risk, rCM1 , is the same as the interest rate on all bonds in the
absence of aggregate risk, i.e., the reward of time   ln: Part 2 applies to conditional yields at
shorter maturities. Aggregate risk generates either a yield premium (in the bad state) or a yield
discount (in the good state), whose value decreases with the maturity of the bond (and eventually
reaches zero as k ! +1.) This reects the demand for government bonds for hedging purposes
against the aggregate risk. In the good state, the expected state at maturity is less favorable
than the current state, and hence expected future marginal utility is greater than current marginal
utility; this drives up the demand for bonds and produces a yield discount relative to the long-run
rate. In the bad state, the opposite occurs: the expected state is more favorable than the current
one and the demand for hedging is low, leading to yield premium and hence a reversion of the yield
curve. This property, which will be valid for all model variants studied below, is a fairly general
result coming from the bounded support of the aggregate shocks. Part 2 also states that the two
conditional yield curves are monotonic, a property that follows from the assumed persistence of
16Most of our results in Sections 4.1 (complete markets) and 4.2 (incomplete markets and zero net asset supplies)
would hold under much more general preferences that those posited in Section 3.4. Both for consistency and clarity,
we maintain our assumed preferences throughout.
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aggregate shocks (as stated in Assumption A).17 Finally, Part 3 pertains to the unconditional
yield curve, i.e., the arithmetic average of the conditional curves weighted by their frequency of
occurrence. For every yield, the yield discount in the good state is on average greater than the yield
premium in the bad state, as hedging is cheaper in the good state (where marginal utility is low)
than in the bad state (where marginal utility is high). Hence, the two do not cancel out, resulting
in a positive average discount on short bonds. Given the assumed persistence of aggregate shocks
and the fact that the terminal payo¤ is spread over the life of the bond, the average yield curve is
itself monotonic.
I.i.d. example. For the complete-market economy as well as the following next two economies
with incomplete markets, we provide a specic example of yield curve under i.i.d. aggregate
shocks, in which case explicit expressions for yields at the two ends of the curve can be ob-
tained throughout. Namely, we assume that zl = 1   " and zh = 1 + ", with h = l =
1=2 and " small. From (16), the yield on one-period bonds in state s = l; h is then rCM;s1 =
  ln()    ln  0:5 1=zh + 1=zl  ln(1=zs) ; and a second-order approximation to the average
yield, rCM1 = (r
CM;l
1 + r
CM;h
1 )=2 around " = 0 gives:
rCM1 =   ln  
1
2
"2: (17)
Given rCM1 , the slope of the yield curve under complete markets, CM = rCM1   rCM1 ; is
CM =
1
2
"2: (18)
4.2 Incomplete markets and zero net bond supply
Our second benchmark economy features incomplete markets against the idiosyncratic risk and
government bonds in zero net supply for all maturities (i.e., for all k = 1; : : : ; n; Ak = 0, so that
Bk = 0). Consequently, the taxes in (5) are also equal to zero at all dates. Since no agent is allowed
to have a short position in bonds (by (8)), bond prices must adjust at all dates up to the point
where the agents with the highest marginal valuation of the bonds have net demands equal to zero,
and no trade ever takes place between the agents. The following assumption allows us to focus on
the interesting case, where uninsured idiosyncratic income risk results in endogenously incomplete
participation in bond markets.
17To see intuitively why persistence of aggregate states is required for monotonicity, consider the extreme opposite
case where the aggregate state oscillates in a deterministic fashion, i.e., h = l = 0; and suppose that the state at
date t is h (a similar reasoning applies in state l). It straightforward, using (15), to show that the resulting yield
curve converges to   ln in an oscillatory manner (i.e., rCM;h2 > rCM;h1 ; rCM;h3 < rCM;h2 ; rCM;h4 > rCM;h3 etc.). The
reason is as follows. The date t demand for one-period bonds is high (because the state at date t + 1 is l for sure),
leading to a low value of rh1 . The demand for two-period bonds is low (because the state at t+2 is h for sure), leading
to a high value of rh2 : However, the demand for three-period bonds is high (because the state at t + 3 is l for sure),
causing the value of rh3 to fall below r
h
2 , and so forth. Under assumption A, such oscillations never occur, whatever
the values of zl and zh:
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Assumption C (Participation condition).
l=zh +
 
1  hu0 ()
1=zl
>
 
1  h =zl + lu0 ()
u0 ()
: (19)
The left hand side of (19) is a lower bound on the pricing kernel of employed (i.e., high-income)
agents, while the right hand side is an upper bound on the pricing kernel of unemployed (i.e.,
low-income) agents. Hence, this assumption will ensure that the pricing kernel of the employed
is always greater than that of the unemployed, implying that only the former buy bonds and are
making prices. A su¢ cient condition for (19) to hold is that  be su¢ ciently small, i.e., that the
unemployed be su¢ ciently worse-o¤ than the employed.18
The following proposition characterizes the bond price structure in the zero-volume economy,
where bond prices are derived from the Euler equations (13).
Proposition 2 (Pricing kernel decomposition under zero net supply). There exists a unique equi-
librium such that:
1. Bond prices are given by pt;k = Et

mZVt+1pt+1;k 1

= Et
hQk
j=1m
ZV
t+j
i
, where the pricing kernel
mZVt+1 can be written as
mZVt+1 = m
CM
t+1 I
ZV
t+1; with I
ZV
t+1 =
t+1=zt+1 + (1  t+1) u0()
1=zt+1
( 1); (20)
2. The yield curves in states h and l converge towards a common, constant limit rZV1 ;
3. If h   l is su¢ ciently small, the yield curve in state h (state l) lies strictly below (above)
rZV1 and is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in the maturity k.
Part 1 of the proposition states that the pricing kernel in the incomplete-market case with
zero net supply, mZVt+1 (where ZV stands for zero volume), is given by the pricing kernel in
the complete-market case, mCMt+1 in (15), times an upward proportional bias I
ZV
t+1 reecting the
possibility of being hit by an uninsurable unemployment shock in the next period in which case
future marginal utility is u0() rather than 1=zt+1.19 While mCMt+1 is determined by agentswill-
ingness to hedge the aggregate risk, IZVt+1 reects their willingness to hedge the idiosyncratic risk.
Parts 2 and 3 follow from the general properties of mZVt+1 and parallel some similar results obtained
18The pricing kernel of the employed is  (t+1=zt+1 + (1  t+1)u0 ()) = (1=zt) which is never less than the
left hand side of (19) for all (zt; zt+1) 2

zl; zh
	2
: Symmetrically, the pricing kernel of the unemployed is

  
1  t+1

=zt+1 + t+1u
0 ()

=u0 () ; which is never greater than the right hand side of (19) for all (zt; zt+1) 2
zl; zh
	2
. Condition (19) is not strong and will be satised under any plausible parameterisation of the extent of
unemployment risk (as given by s and s; s = l; h) and direct unemployment insurance (as determined by ).
19Constantinides and Du¢ e (1996) exhibit a similar factorisation of the pricing kernel under incomplete markets
in the case where agents face permanent rather than transitory idiosyncratic shocks. Krueger and Lustig (2010) also
use a pricing kernel factorisation and exhibit a set of conditions under which incomplete markets do not to a¤ect the
equity premium in their endowment economy. Note that none of their conditions hold in our production economy,
and that our focus is on the pricing of non-contingent bonds (rather than a Lucas tree).
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in the complete-market case studied above. In particular, the long-run yield (i.e., on innite-
maturity bonds) rZV1 is not conditional on the aggregate state but generally di¤ers from that in
the complete-market case, rCM1 (see Appendix B for details).
Before we further characterise the yield curve in the incomplete-market, zero-volume case, let us
briey discuss some implications of Proposition 2. First, incomplete insurance against unemploy-
ment risk, as summarized by a lower value of t+1, tends to raise IZVt+1 and thus to exert a downward
pressure on both conditional yield curves and, by implication, on the average curve. This is a
mere reection of the demand for bonds for self-insurance purposes, which rises as idiosyncratic
income risk rises, all else equal. Second, holding t+1 constant, the conditional covariance between
the two components of the pricing kernel is negative. On the one hand, given zt, a higher value
of zt+1 lowers agentswillingness to hedge the aggregate risk, so that mCMt+1 falls (since expected
future marginal utility, 1=zt+1, falls relative to current marginal utility, 1=zt.) On the other hand,
a higher value of zt+1 raises the di¤erence in marginal utility between being employed (1=zt+1)
and being employed (u0()). This raises agentswillingness to hedge the idiosyncratic risk, so that
IZVt+1 rises.
20 This negative correlation reduces the expected value of the pricing kernel mCMt+1 I
ZV
t+1,
thereby contributing to reducing prices and increasing yields.
Proposition 3 below summarises how idiosyncratic volatility and bond supplies a¤ect the shape
of the yield curve.
Proposition 3 (Incomplete-market, zero-net supply yield curves). Assuming that zh  zl is small,
then the yield curve has the following properties:
1. Without aggregate shocks (i.e. zs = z = 1 and s =  < 1, s = l; h), the yield curve is at
and its level is rCM1   ln (+ (1  ) zu0 ()) < rCM1 , which increases with .
2. When the aggregate state a¤ects productivity (i.e., zh > zl) but not the probability of a bad
idiosyncratic shock (i.e., h = l = ), an increase in that probability (that is, a fall in ) i)
lowers the level of the yield curve in both states l and h, and ii) lowers the level and the slope
of the average yield curve.
3. Time-variations in the probability of a bad idiosyncratic shock (i.e., h > l) may either raise
or lower the slope of the average yield curve, relative to both the complete-market case and
the incomplete-market case with constant transition probabilities. Given a pair of aggregate
productivity levels (zh; zl), there always exists a pair of individual transition rates (h; l)
such that the slope of the average yield curve is larger under incomplete markets than under
complete markets.
Part 1 of the proposition states that in an economy with idiosyncratic risk but no aggregate
shocks, the yield curve is at and its level goes down as unemployment risk becomes more severe
20This negative co-movement between mCMt+1 and I
ZV
t+1 will prevail in any economy in which the income earned when
unemployed is less sensitive to the aggregate state than that earned when employed (e.g., because unemployment
benets are less cyclical than wages.)
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(i.e.,  decreases). Intuitively, a higher level of idiosyncratic risk raises the willingness to hedge
that risk (formally IZVt+1 = I
ZV =  + (1  ) zu0() is constant and decreasing in ); hence, the
demand for bonds for self-insurance purpose rises, which lowers the equilibrium real interest rate
(since rZV1 = rCM1   ln IZV ). This e¤ect of idiosyncratic risk on the steady-state interest rate is
similar to that at work in Huggett (1993) or Aiyagari (1994), among many others.
Part 2 analyses the case where the aggregate state a¤ects labour productivity but not the extent
of unemployment risk.21 First, the levels of the conditional yield curves fall as  does, in either
aggregate state (for the same reason as in Part 1). Second, an increase in idiosyncratic risk (i.e.,
a fall in ) lowers the slope of the yield curve, i.e., it lowers long yields more than short yields.
The reason for this is that, as explained above, the demands for hedging the aggregate and the
idiosyncratic risk go in opposite direction, i.e., the conditional covariance between mZVt+1 and I
ZV
t+1
is negative. This covariance increases in absolute value as  falls, which drives down the demand
for bonds and hence reduces bond prices and raises bond yields. This e¤ect is higher for short
bonds than for long bonds because aggregate risk a¤ects short yields more than longer yields, for
the reason discussed in Section 4.1. The i.i.d. example below provides a simple expression for the
interaction term due to the correlation of the two components of the pricing kernels.
Part 3 of the proposition examines how time-variations in the probability of a bad idiosyncratic
shock may alter the shape of the yield curve, relative to the complete-market case. To see why the
e¤ect is ambiguous in general, consider (with no loss of generality) the impact of a mean-preserving
spread in
 
h; l

relative to the case where  is constant. On the one hand, the higher value of
h lowers the demand for self-insurance in the good state; conversely, the lower value of l raises
the demand for self-insurance in the bad state. The overall impact on the average yield curve is
ambiguous in general and depends on the persistence of the aggregate states. In particular, one
may easily construct example in which a time-varying probability of a bad idiosyncratic shock leads
to a high average term premium on long bonds in the same way as Mankiw (1986) reported that
it may generate a high risk premium. It is notably the case under i.i.d. aggregate shocks, as we
now show.
I.i.d. example. Again, we use the i.i.d. example to illustrate how the presence of uninsured
idiosyncratic risk alters the shape of the yield curve relative to the complete-market case analysed
above. Expressions (40)(41) in Appendix C provide the second-order approximations to the short
and long yields for a general transition matrix across aggregate states, T . The following formulas
are obtained by imposing the i.i.d. shock structure (h = l = 1=2, zh = 1 + " and zl = 1  ") to
those expressions. When aggregate risk only a¤ects z but not , the yield on long (innite-maturity)
bonds is given by:
rZV1 = r
CM
1   ln
 
+ (1  )u0()| {z }
Demand for self-insurance
: (21)
21The assumption that zh   zl is small allows us to use second-order Taylor expansions of the relevant pricing
kernels around the steady state and thereby to characterise analytically the impact of those variables on the slope of
the yield curve.
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As in the complete-market case, aggregate volatility leaves the yield of long bonds independent
of the aggregate state. The additional implication of i.i.d. shocks is that the extent of aggregate
volatility as measured by " has no impact on the level of this common long yield; only the
(constant) probability of a bad idiosyncratic shock (given by 1   ) does, a reection of agents
higher demand for bonds for self-insurance purpose. The average yield on one-period bonds, rZV1 =P
s=l;h r
ZV;s
1 =2; can be decomposed as follows:
rZV1 = r
CM
1   ln
 
+ (1  )u0()| {z }
Demand for self-insurance
+
(1  )u0()
+ (1  )u0()"
2| {z }
Interaction term
: (22)
The short yield is the sum of three terms. The rst, rCM1 , is the short yield under complete
markets, which is recovered in the incomplete-market case when there is no idiosyncratic shocks
(i.e.,  = 1). The second term is the equilibrium yield discount coming from the demand for
hedging the idiosyncratic risk, or demand for self-insurance, which a¤ects the short yield and the
long yield equally. The last term in (22) reects the interaction between the demands for hedging
the aggregate and the idiosyncratic risks.22 As discussed above, when  is not time-varying the
conditional covariance at date t between mCMt+1 and I
ZV
t+1 induced by stochastic changes in zt+1 is
negative. This implies that idiosyncratic risk tends to mitigate agentsdemand for hedging the
aggregate risk, which translates into lower equilibrium prices (that is, higher equilibrium yields).
From (21)(22), the slope of the yield curve in the incomplete-market, zero-volume case, ZV =
rZV1   rZV1 , is
ZV = CM   (1  )u
0()
+ (1  )u0()"
2| {z }
Interaction term
(23)
The rst term in the right hand side of (23) is the slope of the yield curve under complete
markets. The second term comes from the interaction of aggregate and idiosyncratic risks. Since,
as discussed above, the interaction term raises the short yield without a¤ecting the long yield, an
increase in idiosyncratic risk (that is, a fall in  holding " constant) lowers the slope of the yield
curve. It follows that the slope of the yield curve in the incomplete-market, zero-volume case cannot
be higher than the slope under complete markets as long as the probability of a bad idiosyncratic
shock is not itself time-varying and bonds are in zero net supply.
Time-varying probability of a bad idiosyncratic shock. Let us now illustrate the last point of Propo-
sition 3 in the context of our i.i.d. example. To this purpose, we introduce (without loss of
generality) a mean preserving spread in , i.e., h = + a and l =   a, where a is positive but
small. From equations (21)(22) above and (40)(41) in Appendix C, the yields at the two ends of
22As mentioned above, the size of interaction term is scaled by the inverse of the maturity (k 1). This is why it
shows up in the expression for the one-period yield in (22), but not in that for the very long yield in (21).
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the curve become:
~rZV1 = r
ZV
1 +
1
+ (1  )u0()a"; ~r
ZV
1 = r
ZV
1 +
u0()
+ (1  )u0()a":
In the i.i.d. case, times variations in  (a > 0) shift the entire yield curve upwards, provided
that labour productivity is also a¤ected (" > 0). Moreover, since u0() > 1 (by Assumption B),
such variations shift the long yield more than the short yield. It follows that the slope for the yield
curve under time-varying idiosyncratic risk is given by:
~ZV = ZV +
u0()  1
+ (1  )u0()a":
Using this expression and that for ZV above, we infer that ~ZV > CM i.e., the slope of the
yield curve is larger under incomplete markets than under complete marketsprovided that
a >
(1  )u0()
u0()  1 " > 0;
that is, the impact of the aggregate state on the probability of a bad idiosyncratic shock must be
su¢ ciently large compared to its e¤ect on labour productivity.
While the analysis is more involved away from the i.i.d. case, the combined e¤ects of aggregate
and idiosyncratic uncertainty on the yield curve are similar. In particular, i) the demand for
hedging the idiosyncratic shocks a¤ects all yields, while the demand for hedging the aggregate
risk only a¤ects short yields; ii) with constant probability of a bad idiosyncratic shock 1   , an
increase in this probability lowers long yields more than short yields; and iii) there always exist
a = (h   l)=2 such that the slope of the yield curve is larger under incomplete markets than
under complete markets.
4.3 Incomplete markets and positive net bond supply
We now move away from the zero-net-supply assumption and investigate the impact of the volume
of bonds on the shape yield curve. As discussed above, the incompleteness of insurance markets
implies that some agents (the employed) express a specic demand for bonds in order to hedge the
idiosyncratic risk they face (in addition to attempting to hedge the aggregate risk). When bonds are
in positive net supply, these agents are e¤ectively able to use bonds as a bu¤er against idiosyncratic
shocks, thereby partially alleviating the lack of fully functioning credit and insurance markets. This
has two key implications. First, the entire yield curve is a¤ected by the net supply of bonds, since
the latter a¤ect agentsability to hedge the idiosyncratic risk. Second, bonds are e¤ectively traded
in equilibrium: on the one hand, the agents who are hit by a bad idiosyncratic income shock wish
to sell some bonds in order to partly insulate their consumption from the shock; on the other hand,
the agents who are not yet hit by the shock (but anticipate that they might be in the future) are
willing to buy those bonds for self-insurance. That is, the repeated occurrence of idiosyncratic
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shocks together with agentsdesire to hedge them the best they can generate cross-agents trade.
In particular, agents may nd themselves in a situation where they have to liquidate long-maturity
bonds due to the occurrence of a bad idiosyncratic shock, which causes the borrowing constraint
to start bindingprecisely at a time when their trading price is low because the aggregate state
is itself unfavourable. As we show, this generates a specic liquidation risk premium on long
bonds, the value of which depends on the quantity of such bonds in agentsequilibrium portfolios.
As discussed in the introduction, a major issue with incomplete-market models with positive
net asset supplies is their lack of tractability. In particular, these models typically generate a
large-dimensional cross-sectional distribution of wealth, which must be approximated numerically
and solved jointly with the agentsoptimal asset holding decisions. This in turn drastically limits
the number of assets that these models can handle. To circumvent this issue and thereby price
the entire yield curve, including the price of bonds with very long maturity, our approach in this
paper is to impose some restrictions on the structure and deep parameters of the model so that
the model endogenously generates a cross-sectional distribution with a small number of wealth
states. To be more specic, the tractability of our framework is the outcome of two underlying
assumptions. First, quasi-linear preferences imply that all employed agents are willing to work as
much as necessary to bring their marginal utility of consumption (equal to their marginal utility
of wealth) to 1=z (see (12)). Consequently, all employed agents share the same consumption level,
regardless of their history of idiosyncratic shocks. Second, the transitory nature of idiosyncratic
shocks and the assumption that bonds are in positive but small supplies implies that agents in the
bad idiosyncratic state would be willing to issue bonds against future income but are prevented
from doing so by the borrowing constraint. As we show in Appendix D, taken together these two
properties imply that i) all employed agents share the same pricing kernel and hold the same (end-
of-period) asset wealth, regardless of their employment history; and ii) all unemployed agents face a
binding borrowing constraint (and hence hold no asset at the end of the period), regardless of their
employment history. Consequently, our model generates a two-state cross-sectional distribution of
wealth as an equilibrium outcome, which allows us to study bond pricing and trading analytically
for an arbitrarily large number of maturities.
For simplicity, we focus on the case where transition probabilities across employment statuses
are constant in addition to assuming that bond supplies are small.
Assumption D (Small bond volume and constant probability of a bad idiosyncratic shock). (i)
Ak, k = 1; : : : ; n is small; (ii) l = h =  < 1.
The following proposition generalises our pricing-kernel decomposition for the case where mar-
kets are incomplete and bonds are in positive net supply.
Proposition 4 (Pricing kernel decomposition under positive net supply). There exists a unique
equilibrium such that:
1. All employed agents buy the same amount of bonds of each maturity, while all unemployed
20
agents face a binding borrowing constraint (and consequently hold no bonds);
2. The date t price of a bond of maturity k is pt;k = Et

mPVt+1pt+1;k 1

= Et
kY
j=1
mPVt+j, where
mPVt+1 = m
CM
t+1 I
PV
t+1 and (24)
IPVt+1 
=zt+1 + (1  )u0

 +
Pn
j=1 pt+1;j 1 (Bj=!
e)

1=zt+1
: (25)
The rst point of the proposition states the homogeneity properties that make our analysis
tractable. First, the equilibrium features full asset liquidation, in the sense that agents hit
by an unemployment shock liquidate their entire portfolio instantaneously (formally, bit;k = 0 for
all k = 1; : : : ; n if eit = 0). Second, bond holdings are identical across employed agents (i.e.,
bit;k = bt;k > 0 for all k if e
i
t = 1). Under our specication for the borrowing constraint (see
(8)), only public debt enters the portfolio liquidation value. It would not necessarily be the case
if the borrowing constraint were on the total value of the portfolio (i.e.,
Pn
k=1 pt;k b
i
t;k  0). In
this case, agents could in principle use long positions in some maturities to back short positions in
other maturities. However, in our economy all employed agents would choose portfolios with the
same expected total liquidation value, and agents would be indi¤erent between those alternative
portfolios. Consequently, equilibrium bond prices and yields would be una¤ected.23
Under assumption D, employed agents are in constant number !e = (1  ) = (2    ), so
the relevant market clearing conditions imply that bj = Bj=!e, for j = 1; : : : ; n: all agents hold
positive bond quantities and there is no short position at any maturity.
The second point of the proposition generalises the pricing kernel decomposition of the previous
section to account for the fact that employed agents now do hold bonds in equilibrium. Like in the
zero-net-supply case, the equilibrium pricing kernel is the product of the complete-market kernel,
mCMt+1 ; and a correction reecting the demand for hedging the idiosyncratic risk, I
PV
t+1 (where PV
stands for positive volume). The key di¤erence with the zero-net-supply case is that bond volumes
now enter the correction term IPVt+1 (symmetrically across bondholders, by point 1.) Indeed, in an
economy with positive net bond supplies, the portfolio held by the agents may be liquidated when
a bad idiosyncratic shock hits, thereby limiting the associated drop in individual consumption. The
term IPVt+1 reects these better self-insurance possibilities via a lower marginal utility in case a bad
idiosyncratic shock hits (the u0 (:) term in (25)).
We are now in a position to state our main comparative-static results regarding the way relative
bond supplies a¤ect the shape (i.e., the level and the slope) of the yield curve.
Proposition 5 (Incomplete-market, positive-net supply yield curves). Assume that zh zl is small.
Then,
23This result is established formally in the separate technical appendix to the paper.
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1. An increase in the supply of bonds of any maturity i) raises the level of the yield curve in
both states l and h, and ii) raises the level and the slope of the average yield curve;
2. An increase in the supply of long bonds with maturity k  2 raises more the slope of the
average yield curve than an increase in the supply of one-period bonds.
The intution for the latter two results follow from equations (24)(25) which, despite the fact
that they do not as such explicitly solve for equilibrium bond prices and yields since the bond
prices pt;j enter both sides of the asset-pricing formula, nevertheless provide useful insights about
their determinants (see the proof in Appendix D for an explicit solution for bond prices and yields).
The impact of bond supplies on the level of the curve results from two e¤ects. First, by raising
the supply of aggregate liquidity that agents may hold in equilibrium, a greater supply of bonds of
any maturity facilitates self-insurance and reduces the (marginal utility) cost associated with a bad
idiosyncratic shock. The demand for hedging the idiosyncratic risk becomes more satiated (due
to decreasing marginal utility), which depresses all prices and raises all yields in both aggregate
states. Second, higher bond holdings of any maturity except one-period bonds raise the volatility of
the liquidation value of the portfolio,
Pn
j=1 pt+1;j 1 (Bj=!
e) ; and hence that of the pricing-kernel
correction IPVt+1 (one-period bonds do not a¤ect this volatility since they pay out 1 for sure in the
next period). This portfolio volatilitye¤ect raises the consumption risk associated with holding
bonds, which feeds back to the entire yield curve and raises yields at all maturities.
The impact of bond supply and their maturity on the slope of the yield curve also results
from two e¤ects. First, the size of the portfolio
Pn
j=1 pt+1;j 1 (Bj=!
e) modies the correlation
between the two components of the pricing kernel, mCMt+1 and I
PV
t+1, and hence the value of the
interaction term discussed in Section 4.2. Formally, for any given value of , a greater value ofPn
j=1 pt+1;j 1 (Bj=!
e) lowers the marginal utility term u0 (:) in (25). Following an increase in zt+1
which moves mCMt+1 downwards, the rise in I
PV
t+1 is smaller than when
Pn
j=1 pt+1;j 1 (Bj=!
e) = 0.
Hence, the negative correlation between mCMt+1 and I
PV
t+1 is smaller, which mitigates the impact of
the interaction term on yields. This e¤ect is at work after an increase in the quantity of bonds of
any maturity, including one-period bonds (as stated in Point 1 of the proposition).
Second, the slope of the yield curve is a¤ected by the relative supply of bonds, a direct impli-
cation of the liquidation risk associated with holding bonds with maturity greater than one. This
risk refers to the risk that the bonds must be liquidated if the holder is hit by a bad idiosyncratic
shockprecisely at a time when the resale price of the bond is low because the aggregate state is
itself unfavourable. Of course, long bonds may also have to be liquidated in good times but, because
marginal utility is decreasing, these potential gains do not o¤set the cost of having to sell in bad
times, so on average the premium on long bonds must be positive. Formally, the liquidation risk
results from the covariance between the liquidation value of the portfolio,
Pn
j=1 pt+1;j 1 (Bj=!
e),
and bond prices, pt+1;k, both of which uctuate with the aggregate shock. This covariance is zero
for one-period bonds as the latter pay pt+1;0 = 1 for sure in the next period, so such bonds
do not command a liquidation risk premium in equilibrium. For longer bonds, and provided that
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 < 1 (so that agents e¤ectively face idiosyncratic income variations), the co-movements between
the portfolios liquidation value and bond prices generates a negative covariance term between the
pricing kernel mPVt+1 via the marginal utility term in (25)and the bondsfuture resale price. This
negative covariance depresses the current price of such bonds, i.e., it raises their yield. In short,
by holding long rather than short bonds, agents run the risk of nding themselves poor precisely
when they most need cash and thus require a compensation for bearing this risk.
I.i.d example. Again, we provide further intuition for our results by means of a second-order
approximation to the yield curve under small, i.i.d. aggregate shocks. Let pk denote the price of a k-
period bond in the steady state (without aggregate shocks) and W =
P1
k=1 pkbk the corresponding
value of bond holdersportfolio, where bk = Bk=!e is the equilibrium quantity of k-period bonds in
any bondholders portfolio. By assumption, W is small because volumes are small, and an increase
in the volume of bonds of any maturity raises W . In this case, the approximate expressions for the
long and the short yields, are given by (see equations (58)(59) in Appendix F):
rPV1 = r
ZV
1 +
(1  )( u00())
+ (1  )u0()W| {z }
Impact of volumes on demand for self-insurance
+
(1  )( u00())
(+ (1  )u0())2
 
W   b1

"2| {z }
Portfolio volatility
+
(1  )( u00())
+ (1  )u0()
 
W   b1

"2| {z }
Liquidation risk
(26)
rPV1 = r
ZV
1 +
(1  )( u00())
+ (1  )u0()W| {z }
Impact of volumes on demand for self-insurance
+
(1  )( u00())
(+ (1  )u0())2
 
W   b1

"2| {z }
Portfolio volatility
  (1  )( u
00())
(+ (1  )u0())2W"
2| {z }
Impact of volumes on interaction term
(27)
The latter two equations summarise how bond volumes a¤ect bond yields at the two ends of
the curve, relative to the zero-net-supply, incomplete-market yield curve. As discussed above, the
two yields under consideration incorporate two additional level e¤ects i.e., a¤ecting both yields
equally, relative to their zero-net-supply counterparts. First, an increase in the supply of any
bond facilitates self-insurance, which lowers the demand for bonds and hence raises all yields (the
Impact of volumes on demand for self-insurance term in (26)(27)).24 Second, an increase in
24To see most clearly how positive bond volumes impact the demand for self-insurance, consider how the term
  ln (+ (1  )u0()) in equations (21)(22) is modied when the value of the liquidated portfolio, W , is added to
the consumption of agents hit by a bad idiosyncratic shock so that the marginal utility term is u0( +W ) instead
of u0(): Then, for W small we have
  ln  + (1  )u0( +W ) '   ln  + (1  )u0()| {z }
Demand for self-insurance (zero net supply)
+
(1  )( u00())
+ (1  )u0()W| {z }
Impact of volum es on demand for self-insurance
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bond holdings with maturity greater than one raises the volatility of bondholdersportfolio (and
hence that of the pricing kernel), which deters additional bond purchases and again raises all yields
(hence the Portfolio volatilityterm in (26)(27)). Again, this second level e¤ect does not apply
to holdings of one-period bonds, since those generate no portfolio volatility; hence, a pure increase
in the supply of short bonds (such that dW =db1) only shifts the level of the yield curve via the
demand for self-insurance channel.
From (26)(27), the slope of the yield curve is given by:
PV = ZV +
(1  )( u00())
(+ (1  )u0())2W"
2| {z }
Impact of volumes on interaction term
+
(1  )( u00())
+ (1  )u0()
 
W   b1

"2| {z }
Liquidation risk premium
: (28)
Positive bond volumes a¤ect the slope (relative to the zero-net-supply case) by i) lowering the
short yield (see the Impact of volumes on interaction termin (27)), and ii) raising the long yield
provided that the supply of bonds with maturity greater than one is raised (see the Liquidation
risk premiumterm in (26)). As discussed above, the impact on the slope coming from a lower short
yield relative to the zero-volume case comes from the fact that the interaction term is now a¤ected
by the supply of bonds.25 The last term in (28), isolates the liquidation risk premium commanded
by long bonds over short bonds. This liquidation risk only applies to the part of agentswealth
made of bonds with maturity greater than one, since the liquidation value of one-period bonds is
independent of the aggregate state. To summarize, equation (28) implies that an increase in the
supply of bonds of any maturity raises the slope of the yield curve, and an increase in the supply
of bonds with maturity greater than one raises more the slope than an increase in the supply of
one-period bonds (due to the liquidation risk premium). Hence, both the size and the maturity
structure of the debt a¤ect the slope of the yield curve.
Numerical application. Let us illustrate the e¤ect of bond volumes on the shape of the yield
curve by means of a simple numerical example. The period is a year. We assume that u (c) =
Ac1 = (1  ), with A = :4 and  = 2:5,  = :967. Productivity levels are given by zh = :55591,
zl = :4, with transition probabilities h = :8, l = :5. Individual labour market transition rates are
constant and given by  = :995 and  = :5. Finally, home production is  = :2:We start with a zero
net supply benchmark, and from then raise the supply of bonds. The second and third columns
of Table 1 show the implied 1- and 10- year interest rates, respectively, while the fourth column
shows the slope  = r10  r1. The calibration has been chosen so that the shape of the yield curve
25Recall from our analysis in Section 4.2 that the interaction term a¤ects the short yield but not the yield on
long (innite-maturity) bonds, and consider how the interaction term in (22) is modied when agents hit by an
idiosyncratic shock consume  +W instead of . For W small, we have:
(1  )u0( +W )
+ (1  )u0( +W )"
2 ' (1  )u
0()
+ (1  )u0()"
2
| {z }
Interaction term (zero volum e)
+
(1  )( u00())
(+ (1  )u0())2W"
2
| {z }
Impact of volum es on interaction term
24
benchmark economy matches that of the real yield curve U.S. economy over the period 1997-2009
for which data are available.26 The third line of the Table shows how the shape of the yield curve
changes as we raise the supply of bonds from 1 year to 10 years by 6:10 4, which increases of the
ratio of debt to output by 1 percentage point. The fourth line reports the implied changes in the
level and slope of the curve, expressed as basis points.27
Interest rates r1 r10 
Benchmark economy (%) 1.800 2.720 0.920
Economy with higher debt (%) 1.836 2.757 0.921
Change in interest rates (bp) 3.6 3.7 0.1
Table 1: E¤ect of a debt increase on the yield curve
5 Concluding remarks
It is often claimed that the reason why long bonds command a premium over short bonds is that
they are less liquid, in the sense of being convertible into cash at more uncertain terms. In
this paper, we have constructed a dynamic general-equilibrium model of the term structure under
incomplete markets that is consistent with this view: holders of long bonds must be compensated
for bearing the liquidation risk associated to these bonds, i.e., the risk that their price be low due
to unfavourable macroeconomic conditionsprecisely when the holder needs to liquidate them in
order to bu¤er an adverse idiosyncratic income shock. Put di¤erently, long, noncontingent bonds are
a poor hedge against idiosyncratic shocks, because aggregate shocks cause the liquidation value of
the bond portfolio which explicitly enters bondholderspricing kernel under incomplete markets
and positive net bond supply to covary with bond prices. In contrast, one-period bonds are a
much better hedge, since they are not resold and, consequently, have a payo¤ that is completely
independent of bondholderswealth (of course, neither long nor short bonds ar perfect hedges since
both fails to be contingent on bondholdersindividual state).
It seems natural, when considering the impact of liquidation risk on asset prices, to start by
focusing on real, zero-coupon bonds, which by construction bear no income risk and only di¤er
by their maturity. This strategy allowed us to isolate this specic source of risk and to distin-
guish it most clearly from the other sources of risk that potentially a¤ect more complex nancial
instruments. However, all long assets that are not indexed on agents idiosyncratic state (most
prominently: the stock market) potentially bear this risk, and for this reason should command a
26Real zero-coupon yield curves are constructed by J. Huston McCulloch using US Treasury Ination-Protected
Securities (TIPS), and made available at www.econ.ohio-state.edu/jhm/ts/ts.html#arch
27The gures are consistent with the recent estimates of Laubach (2009) who nds that an increase of the volume of
public debt by 1% of GDP increases interest rates between 3bp and 4bp. In a separate technical appendix, we study
a quantitative version of our model that relaxes some of its structural assumptions. More specically, we consider an
economy in which i) the aggregate state has continuous rather than discrete support, ii) agents do not instantaneously
liquidate their asset wealth, iii) agents may trade a positive-supply asset whose payo¤ is contingent on the aggregate
state, iv) the tax structure is more general than in the baseline model, and v) the supply of bonds is time-varying
and indexed on the aggregate state. The relaxed model conrms the theoretical results obtained under our baseline
assumptions.
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premium over short assets. Similarly, liquidation risk would be present in a monetary version of
our framework that would generate a nominal yield curve about which a wealth of evidence is
available. We leave both of these lines of investigation for future research.
Appendix
A. Proof of proposition 1
1. Yield of innite-maturity bonds. From (16) and the fact that zt is bounded, we have
limk!1 rt;k =   ln  rCM1 (which is independent of the aggregate state).
2. Monotonicity of conditional yield curves. Let us denote T k = (T kij)i;j=l;h, where T
k
ij is the
ijs element of T k (T to the k, with T given by (1)), that is, the probability of being in aggregate
state j k periods ahead when the current state is i. Assumption A implies that the sequences
T khh
	1
k=1
and

T kll
	1
k=1
, where
 
T 1hh; T
1
ll

=
 
h; l

and

T k+1hh ; T
k+1
hh

= (T khh
 
h + l   1+ 1 
l; T kll
 
h + l   1 + 1   h), are positive and nondecreasing. From (16), the yield di¤erences
rCM1   rsk; s = l; h are:
rCM1   rhk =
1
k
ln

T khh +

1  T khh
 zh
zl

> 0; rCM1   rlk =
1
k
ln

T kll +

1  T kll
 zl
zh

< 0: (29)
Since 1=k is strictly decreasing in k while T khh +
 
1  T khh

zh
zl
is nonincreasing in k (by the
monotonicity of

T khh
	1
k=1
and the fact that zh  zl), rCM1   rsk is strictly decreasing in k. Hence,
rhk lies below r
CM1 and is strictly increasing in k. A symmetric argument applies to the yield curve
in state l.
3. Monotonicity of the average yield curve. From (29), the average yield di¤erence  (k) 
rk   rCM1 is given by:
 (k) =  1  
l
k
ln

T khh +

1  T khh
 zh
zl

  
l
k
ln

T kll +

1  T kll
 zl
zh

; (30)
with l =
 
1  h =  2  h   l : Diagonalising T , we may express  T kll ; T khh as follows:
T khh = 
l(h + l   1)k + 1  l and T kll = (1  l)(h + l   1)k + l; (31)
Substituting (31) into (30), we can write  (k) =  (k)=k, where (k) is a function parame-
terised by l and h. Taking derivatives, we can show that @(k2 0(k))/@k =  k00(k) is positive.
This in turn implies that  (k) < 0 and  0(k) > 0, i.e., rk lies below rCM1 and is strictly increasing
in k.
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B. Proof of proposition 2
1. Pricing kernel From (12)(13), we nd that
pt;k = Et

t+1
zt
zt+1
+ (1  t+1) ztu0 ()

pt+1;k 1

, k = 1; : : : ; n;
which provides the pricing factorization in mZVt+1 and I
ZV
t+1. From the literature on asset pricing
with nite state-space (e.g., Mehra and Prescott (1985)), we conjecture (and verify) the existence
of an equilibrium in which bond prices at any date t only depend on the current aggregate state st
(and not on the whole history st, i.e., pt;k(st) = pt;k). With two aggregate states, bond prices are
generated by the following recursions:
psk
zs
= s
 
s + (1  s) zsu0 () psk 1
zs
+  (1  s)  s +  1  s zsu0 () psk 1
zs
; s = l; h; (32)
for k = 1; : : : ; n and where s is the state opposite to s. From (13), at these prices unemployed
agents face a binding borrowing constraint in state s if and only if:
psku
0() > 

s

1  s
zs
+ su0()

psk 1 + (1  s)

1  s
zs
+ su0()

psk 1

; s = l; h:
Assumption C is a su¢ cient condition for these two inequalities to be satised when bond prices
satisfy (32), so that unemployed agents do not participate in bond markets (i.e., they would like
to issue bonds, but face a binding borrowing constraint, in either aggregate state).
2. Convergence towards a common limit. We rst prove the following technical lemma.
Lemma 1. Let (un)n0, (vn)n0 be two real sequences such that [ un vn ]> = M [ un 1 vn 1 ]>,
where M is a 2  2 real diagonalisable matrix whose eigenvalues max and min are such that
max  min > 0. Then,
  n 1 ln(un)n0 and   n 1 ln(vn)n0 converge towards the common
limit ln(max).
Proof: Diagonalising M , we may rewrite the recursion in the Lemma as"
un
vn
#
= Q
"
nmax 0
0 nmin
#
Q 1
"
u0
v0
#
;
where (max; min), max  min  0, are the eigenvalues of M and Q the matrix of eigenvectors.
un
nmax
and vnnmax are a¢ ne functions of

min
max
n
, which is positive and either is equal to 1 or converges
towards 0 as n!1. Thus, unnmax and
vn
nmax
converge towards nite limits. We infer that  1n ln( unnmax )
and   1n ln( vnnmax ) converge toward 0, and that limn!1 
1
n ln(un) = limn!1  1n ln(vn) = ln(max)
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We may rewrite the bond price recursion in (32) in matrix form as follows:
[ phk=z
h plk=z
l ]> = MZV [ phk 1=z
h plk 1=z
l ]> for k  1, with ps0 = 1, (33)
MZV = 
 
hh
 
1  hl 
1  lh ll
!
and s  s + (1  s)zsu0(): (34)
Then, Lemma 1 implies that limk!1 rsk = r
ZV1 , s = h; l, where
rZV1 =   ln()  ln (1) ; and (35)
1=2 =
1
2

h h + l l 

(h h + l l)2   4h l(h + l   1)
 1
2

: (36)
3. Monotonicity of conditional yield curves. As stated in the proposition, a su¢ cient
condition for the monotonicity of conditional yield curves in the incomplete-market, zero-volume
case is that l and h be su¢ ciently close to each other. The necessary and su¢ cient condition is
l + (h   1)z
h
zl

l + (1  l)zlu0()



h + (l   1) z
l
zh

h + (1  h)zhu0()

; (37)
and is indeed satised when l and h are close to each other, including when h = l. Under
(37), the eigenvalues (1; 2) of MZV in (36) satisfy
2  1  hh + (1  h)

zh=zl

l; (38)
2  hh  1: (39)
Since 1 is the largest eigenvalue, we have 2  1, while (37) implies that the second inequality
in (38) also holds. The inequalities in (39) directly follow from (36) and the denition of s in (34).
From (33), bond prices are given by [ phk=z
h plk=z
l ]> = MZV;k[ 1=zh 1=zl ]>, whereMZV;k  
MZV
k
(MZV to the k) is diagonalisable and can be written as
MZV;k = kP
"
k1 0
0 k2
#
P 1; with P =
"
(1  h)l (1  h)l
1   hh 2   hh
#
:
From the latter recursion and equation (35), we nd that rhk   rZV1 = ~(k)=k, where
~(k)  ln [1   2]  ln

k2
k1

1   hh   (1  h)z
h
zl
l

 

2   hh   (1  h)z
h
zl
l

:
Condition (37) implies that 1k
@
@k

k2
@(rhk rZV1 )
@k

> 0 and successively that k2
@(rhk rZV1 )
@k > 0 and
@(rhk rZV1 )
@k > 0: The yield curve is increasing in state h and converges from below to r
ZV1 .
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C. Proof of Proposition 3
Lemma 2. Consider the following mean-preserving spread in aggregate and idiosyncratic risks
around their unconditional means (z; ): h =  + 2l a, l =    2  1  l a, zh = z  1 + 2l"
and zl = z
 
1  2  1  l " (where l =  1  l =  2  l   h : A second-order development in
a and " gives
ZV =
2(1  h)(1  l)(h + l)
(2  h   l)3(+ (1  )zu0())2

 (3  h   l)(h + l   1)(zu0()  1)2a2
+2(zu0() 1)((2 h l)2 +(1 )zu0())" a+

2(2  h   l)2   (1  )2z2u0()2

"2


Proof. Let us rst dene   l + h, 
  [(2  )(+ (1  )zu0())] 1 and s the state
opposite to s. From (20), the second-order expansion around (a; ") = 02 of the conditional one-
period yield gives
rZV;s1 =   ln()  ln(+ (1  )zu0())
 2
(1  s) (   1)(zu0()  1)a  ((2  ) + (1  )zu0())"
+ 2
2(1  s)2(   1)2(zu0()  1)2a2
+ 4
2(1  s) s(2  )2(+ (1  )zu0()) + (1  s)(P   1)2zu0() a"
+ 2
2(1  s)
"
(1  s)((2  ) + (1  )zu0())2
 2(1  s)(2  )(+ (1  )zu0())
#
"2; (40)
where  is a   if s = h and a + if s = l. Moreover, the second-order expansion of rZV1 in (35))
gives:
rZV1 =   ln()  ln(+ (1  )zu0())  4
2(1  l)l

(   1)(zu0()  1)2 a2
+ 4
2(1  l)lzu0() ()(+ (1  )zu0())  2(   1) a"
  4
2(1  l)l
h
(   1)  (1  )zu0()2i "2: (41)
The average short yield is rZV1 = 
lrl1 +
 
1  l rh1 and the slope is ZV = rZV1   rZV1 :
1. Yield curve without aggregate shocks. Without aggregate shocks, (20) gives rk =
  ln()  ln(+ (1  )zu0()), k = 1; : : : ; n:
2. Impact of  on level and the slope of the yield curve The level e¤ect is proven by
induction. From (33)(34) and with l = h = , we have, for k = 1;
@ (ps1=z
s)
@
= s
 
1  zsu0 () 1
zs

+  (1  s)
 
1  zsu0 () 1
zs

; s = l; h;
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which is negative since 1  zsu0 () < 0 (by Assumption B). For k  2; we have
@ (psk=z
s)
@
= s
" 
1  zsu0 () psk 1
zs
+
 
+ (1  ) zsu0 () @  psk 1=zs
@
#
+ (1  s)
" 
1  zsu0 () psk 1
zs
+
 
+ (1  ) zsu0 () @  psk 1=zs
@
#
;
We know that 1 zsu0 () < 0, psk 1 > 0 and +(1  ) zsu0 () > 0. Thus, if @
 
psk 1=z
s

=@ <
0 for s = l and s = h, then @ (psk=z
s) =@ < 0 for s = l and s = h. Since @ (ps1=z
s) =@ < 0, s = l; h;
this is true for all k  1: It follows that a rise in idiosyncratic volatility (a fall in ) raises all bond
prices, and thus lowers all bond yields, in both aggregate states. By implication, the same is true
of the average yield curve.
From Lemma 2, when a = 0 we have
@ZV
@
= 4
3(1  h)(1  l)() (2  )2 + (1  )zu0() zu0()"2 > 0:
3. Greater slope under incomplete markets/zero-volume than under complete markets
From Lemma 2, the slope is a quadratic concave function in a (negative coe¢ cient in a2) that admits
a unique maximum. It is then easy to check that the maximal value of the slope is ZVmax, with:
ZVmax  CM =
2(2  )(1  h)(1  l)()
(3  )(   1) "
2 > 0;
where CM = 2l(1  l)()"2 is the slope in the complete-market case.
D. Proof of Proposition 4
1. Equilibrium portfolios. We proceed by construction: we rst conjecture, and then derive a
su¢ cient condition for, the existence of an equilibrium in which employed agents hold symmetric
portfolios and never face a binding borrowing constraint, while unemployed are always borrowing-
constrained and hold no bond. Formally, we conjecture, for k = 1; :::n:
eit = 1) 'it;k = 0 and eit = 0) 'it;k > 0: (42)
Conjectured consumption levels and equilibrium pricing kernel. Consider rst the consumption level
of an unemployed agent at date t. If the agent was employed at date t  1, then from the budget
constraint (7) and conjecture (42) the agent liquidates his entire portfolio and consume
cit =  +
nX
k=1
pt;k 1 bit 1;k (> 0) : (43)
If, however, this agent was already unemployed at date t   1, then by (7) and (42) the agents
30
consumes cuut =  > 0:
Now consider the consumption level of an employed agent at date t. From (12), this agent
enjoys marginal utility 1=zt regardless of ei;t and consumes cet = u
0 1 (1=zt) (> 0). If this agent
stays employed in the next period (which occurs with probability ), he will enjoy marginal utility
1=zt+1 (again by (12)). If, on the contrary, this agent moves into unemployment in the next
period (which occurs with probability 1  ), then his marginal utility will be u0  cit+1, where by
construction cit+1 is given by (43). Then, substituting these marginal utilities into the intertemporal
optimality conditions for employed agents (13) under conjecture (42), we obtain the following set
of Euler equations:
pt;k
zt
= Et

pt+1;k 1
zt+1

+ (1  )Et
24u0
0@ + nX
j=1
pt+1;j 1bit;j
1A pt+1;k 1
35 , k = 1; : : : ; n: (44)
From (44), the bond demands bit;j are functions of aggregate variables only. Total supply
being Bk, market clearing requires that bt;k = Bk=!e, meaning that no agent holds negative bond
quantities. Substituting it in (44) together with (4), we express prices as a function of aggregate
variables only.
Following the same steps, borrowing constraint condition (42) becomes:
pt;k u
0 () >  (1  )Et

pt+1;k 1
zt+1

+ Et

pt+1;k 1u0 ()

; (45)
where  t is given by (4). On the other hand, agents who were employed at date t   1 and who
become unemployed at date t face a binding borrowing constraint if and only if, for all k = 1; : : : ; n:
pt;k u
0
0@ + nX
j=1
pt;j 1Bj
!e
1A > (1  )Et pt+1;k 1
zt+1

+ Et

pt+1;k 1u0 ()

(46)
Since (46) implies (45), we only need to check that the equilibrium satises (46).
We prove the equilibrium existence in three steps. First, we derive initial conditions allowing
us to avoid transitory dynamics. Second, we show the equilibrium exists when volumes are 0 and
when there is no aggregate shocks. Third, we show by a continuity argument that the equilibrium
exists when volumes and aggregate shocks are small. The technical part is the proof of continuity.
Conditions on agents initial wealth. We assume that employed agents enter period 0 holding
a quantity of bonds b 1;k = Bk=!e with probability , and no bond with probability 1   .
Unemployed agents hold no bond with probability , and b 1;k = Bk=!e bonds with probability
1   . The initial joint distribution of employment status and bond holdings is thus identical to
the stationary distribution.
Existence of a no-trade equilibrium without aggregate shocks. If assets are in zero net supply, then
there is no trade between agents and both the liquidation value of the portfolio and taxes will be
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equal to zero. Without aggregate uncertainty zh = zl = z, one easily nds the price of a one period
bonds p = mZV , where mZV is given by (20). Rearranging (46) yields the following inequality:
(+ (1  )zu0 ()) zu0 () > 1   +  zu0 (). Since zu0 () > 1 by assumption B, the right hand
side is maximum at  = 1, in which case the inequality remains true for any value of ; hence the
no-trade equilibrium exists in the economy with zero volume and without aggregate risk.
Continuity of the yield curve w.r.t. bond supplies and aggregate shocks. Let us introduce the
following change of variables, which greatly simplies the algebra:
Csk = p
s
k=z
s; s = h; l; k = 1; : : : ; n: (47)
Solving for Csk is equivalent to solving for prices (given the z
ss). We now dene B  [Bn : : : B1]>
as the vector of bond quantities for the n maturities, Z  zl zh> as the vector of productivity
levels, and C  Chn C ln : : : Ch0 C l0> as the vector of price coe¢ cients. 1n and 0n are vectors of
length n containing respectively only ones and zeros. We then have the following lemma:
Lemma 3 (Equilibrium existence). There are neighbourhoods B of 0n and Z of 12, such that if
B 2 B and Z 2 Z then C is a C1 function of B and of Z.
Proof. Let us rst dene X  [zh zl B>] and vs  v

 + (zs=!e)
Pn
j=1C
s
j 1Bj

, whether
v = u0 or u00 (for example, u0h  u0( +  zh=!ePnj=1Chj 1Bj)). Finally, let 1cond: be the function
that takes value 1 when cond: is true and 0 otherwise, and
M(C;X)  
"
h(+ (1  ) zh u0h) (1  h)(+ (1  ) zl u0l)
(1  l)(+ (1  ) zh u0h) l(+ (1  ) zl u0l)
#
: (48)
Since bij = Bj=!
e, (44) can be written as follows:
[ Chk C
l
k
]> = M(C;X)  [ Chk 1 C lk 1 ]> for k = 1; : : : ; n: (49)
By stacking equalities, we rewrite (49) as f(C;X) = 0(2n+2)1, where f is the following C1
function:
f(C;X)  C  
2666664
022 M(C;X) 022 : : : 022
...
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . . M(C;X)
022 : : : 022
3777775 C  
266666664
0
...
0
1=zh
1=zl
377777775
:
To prove that C is a C1 function of B and Z, we show that the Jacobian of f w.r.t. C is
invertible. The derivatives of f w.r.t.
 
Csn i

i=0;:::;n
can be written as @f=@Csn i =  
s
n i + K
s
n i,
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i = 0; : : : ; n; with  sn i dened, for i = 0, as  
s
n  [1s=h; 1s=l; 02n]> and, for i = 1; : : : ; n, as
 sn i 
266666666664
02(i 1)1
  (+ (1  )zsu0s) ehs
  (+ (1  )zsu0s) els
1s=h
1s=l
02(n i)1
377777777775    Rank 2i+ 1   Rank 2i+ 2;
where ehh  h; elh  1  l; ell  l; ehl  1  h and
Ksn i    (1  ) [Bn+1 i 1i>0=!e] (zs)2 u00s

hehsCsn 1; elsCsn 1 : : : ; ehsCs0 ; elsCs0 ; 0; 0i> for i = 0; : : : ; n:
The Jacobian DfY = (
@f
@Chn
; @f
@Cln
; : : : ; @f
@Chn i
; @f
@Cln i
; : : : ; @f
@Ch0
; @f
@Cl0
) of f w.r.t. to C can be ex-
pressed as the sum of an upper triangular matrix with only 1s on its diagonal and a matrix that
is equal to 0 when B = 0 (because Ksn i = 0 if B = 0). The Jacobian is thus invertible for B = 0.
Then, the implicit function theorem allows us to prove that C is a continuous (in fact C1) function
of

B> Z>

in a neighbourhood V1 of

0>n 1>2

. Moreover, if

B> Z>

=

0>n 1>2

, then C satises
conditions (46). By continuity, there exists a neighbourhood V2  V1, such that condition (46) is
satised if

B> Z>
 2 V2. 
The lemma establishes that, starting from a no uncertainty/zero net supply situation, a gradual
increase in aggregate risk or bond supplies does not cause the yield curve to jump. Since the
equilibrium exists in the zero-volume/no aggregate uncertainty case, it also exists when volumes
and aggregate risk are su¢ ciently small (that is, (46) holds).
2. Pricing kernel decomposition Substituting the market-clearing condition bt;k = Bk=!e
into the Euler equation (44) and rearranging gives the bond-pricing equation and the corresponding
pricing kernel components in the proposition.
E. Proof of Proposition 5
1a. Impact of bond supplies on the level of the yield curve. We prove the result by
induction. Taking the derivative of (49) w.r.t. to Bi, 1  i  n, we get:
@Ck
@Bi
= 
X
s=h;l
es
24(+ (1  )zsu0s)@Csk 1
@Bi
+
(1  )Csk 1(zs)2u00s
!e
nX
j=1

@Csj 1
@Bi
Bj + C
s
i 1
35
(50)
where u0s and u00s are dened in the proof of Lemma 3, and the es are as in Lemma 3.
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 The result holds for k = 1, since for small bond supplies we have
@C1
@Bi
  (1  )u
00 ()
!e
X
s=h;l
e&szsCsi 1 < 0:
 Suppose that the result holds for k   1: @C
h
k 1
@Bi
;
@Clk 1
@Bi
< 0. Since Csj 1 is a C1 function of Bi,
@Csj 1
@Bi
is continuous in Bi and Bj
@Csj 1
@Bi
is negligible relative to Csi 1 for small bond supplies.
Then, (50) implies @C
h
k
@Bi
< 0, so that greater bond supply decreases prices (i.e., raises yields).
1b. Impact of bond supplies on the slope of the yield curve. Diagonalising M(C;X) in
(48), we get M(C;X) = QDQ 1, where Q is a invertible matrix and D = Diag(~1; ~2); with
~1 = H + ~2 =
1
2



h + l

+ (1  )

zhu0hh + zlu0ll

+H

; and
H 
"  
(h + l) + (1  )(zhh u0h + zll u0l)2
 4(h + l   1)(+ (1  )zh u0h)(+ (1  )zl u0l)
#1=2
> 0:
Using Lemma 1, the long yield rPV1 is given by:
lim
k!1
rhk = lim
k!1
rlk =   ln   ln (~1) : (51)
From (48)(49) and the fact that Cs0 = 1=z
s, the short yield in state s is:
rs1 =   ln ps1 =   ln   ln

s(+ (1  )zsu0s) + (1  s)(zs=zs + (1  )zsu0s) ; s = l; h;
where s is the state opposite to s.
As in proof of Proposition 3, we consider a mean preserving spread in z and carry out a second-
order Taylor expansion of the derivative of the slope of the yield curve w.r.t. to an increase in bond
supplies of maturity j (i.e., @
PV
@Bj
=
@(rPV1  ((1 l)rh1+lrl1))
@Bj
) around " = 0 and zero net volumes.
The next section presents a second-order Taylor expansion of PV for the case of i.i.d. shocks,
which leads to the expressions in (26)(27). For a general shock process, we only focus on the
expansion of @
PV
@Bj
. We just state the result here and leave the proof in the separate technical
appendix. In the general case, the derivative of the slope of the yield curve w.r.t. to an increase in
bond supplies of maturity j is found to be:
@PV
@Bj

Bk=0; k=1;:::;n
=
4
2(1  h)(1  l)()  (2  )2+ (1  )zu0()
(2  )(+ (1  )zu0())2 j
 (1  ) ( zu
00())
!e
j 1
 
+ 1j>1
j 2X
i=0
(   1)i  (2  )+ (1  )zu0()! "2;
with 1j>1 = 1 if j > 1 and 0 if j = 1, and where  = l+h and 
  [(2  )(+ (1  )zu0())] 1.
34
The impact on volumes the slope is thus positive.
2. Impact on the slope of an increase in the relative supply of short bonds. From
the latter expression we have @PV =@B1 < @PV =@Bj>1, an increase in the supply of one-period
bonds increases less the slope of the yield curve than an increase in the supply of bonds of any
maturity greater than one.
F. Positive net bond supplies: explicit formulas in the i.i.d. case
First, we have Ch0 = (1 + ")
 1 and C l0 = (1  ") 1. Using the recursion (48)(49) to compute Cs1 ;
s = l; h and rearranging, we nd
Cs1 =

1  "2 + (1  )u
0() +
(1  )u00()
2
24(1 + ") nX
j=1
Chj 1
Bj
!e
+ (1  ")
nX
j=1
C lj 1
Bj
!e
)
35 ;
which in turn implies that Ch1 = C
l
1  C1. The same recursion gives, for j  2;
Csj
Csj 1
=  + (1  )u0() +  (1  )u
00()
2
24(1 + ") nX
j=1
Chj 1
Bj
!e
+ (1  ")
nX
j=1
C lj 1
Bj
!e
)
35 :
By induction, Chj = C
l
j  Cj for all j  1, so the latter two equations can be written as:
C1 =

1  "2 + (1  )u
0() + (1  )u00()
0@B1
!e
+
nX
j=2
Cj 1
Bj
!e
1A ; (52)
Cj
Cj 1
= + (1  )u0() + (1  )u00()
0@B1
!e
+ (1 + "2)
nX
j=2
Cj 1
Bj
!e
1A : (53)
Equations (52)(53) dene a system of n equations with n unknown, the Cjs. The solution
to this system expresses the vector [Cj ]
n
j=1 as a function of "
2, and for small shocks we have
Cj ' Cj +
 
@2"Cj

"2; j = 1; : : : ; n, where Cj is the value of Cj without aggregate shocks and 
@2"Cj
  @Cj=@"2"2=0 (both the Cjs and the  @2"Cjs are undetermined coe¢ cients at this stage).
Moreover, we dene W  1!e
Pn
j=1 pj 1Bj =
1
!e
Pn
j=1Cj 1Bj as the value of the portfolio without
aggregate shocks, W 2  W   B1=!e = 1!e
Pn
j=2Cj 1Bj the same value excluding holdings of
one-period bonds, and
 
@2"W
  1!e Pnj=2  @2"Cj 1Bj as the change in the value of the portfolio
following a marginal change in "2. Computing the rst-order approximations to the right hand
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sides of (52)(53) around "2 = 0, we get
C1 '  + (1  )u0() + (1  )u00()W| {z }
= C1
+
 
 + (1  )u00()  @2"W | {z }
=(@2"C1)
"2; (54)
Cj
Cj 1
=  + (1  )u0() + (1  )u00()W| {z }
= C1
+ (1  )u00()  W 2 +  @2"W | {z }

"2: (55)
From (55), we have, for j  2; Cj = Cj 1 C1 + Cj 1"2. Using this recursion starting at
C1 = C1 +
 
@2"C1

"2 and neglecting terms in "4; we nd that, for j  1;
Cj '
 
C1
j
+
 
C1
j 1
(
 
@2"C1

+ (j   1))"2;
where Cj =
 
C1
j
. Now substitute the values for
 
@2"C1

and  in (54) and (55) into the latter
expression to nd
Cj '
 
C1
j
+
 
C1
j 1
( + (1  )u00() (j   1)W 2 + j  @2"W )"2:
For small bond volumes, the terms in W; W 2 and
 
@2"W

(which include the Bjs) are second-
order relative to , so the latter equation gives Cj '
 
C1
j
+ 
 
C1
j 1
"2; where C1 '  +
(1  )u0() (by (54)). Since Cj ' Cj +
 
@2"Cj

"2; this implies that
 
@2"Cj
 '   C1j 1, which
in turn gives Cj '
 
C1
j
+ 
 
C1
j 1
"2. We infer
 
@2"W

to be:
 
@2"W

=
nX
j=2
(@"Cj 1)Bj
!e
'
nX
j=2

 
C1
j 2
Bj
!e
=

Pn
j=2
 
C1
j 1
Bj
!eC1
=
W 2
+ (1  )u0() :
(56)
From (51), the long yield in the i.i.d. case is
rPV1 =   ln()  ln

+
1  
2
((1 + ")u0h + (1  ")u0l)

; (57)
with u0s = u0

 + 1!e
Pn
j=1 p
s
j 1Bj

. Since psj 1 = Cj 1z
s for j  2 and ps0 = 1, we have
u0s = u0
0@ + B1
!e
+
1 "
!e
nX
j=2
Cj 1Bj
1A ' u0 () + u00()
0@B1
!e
+
1 "
!e
nX
j=2
Cj 1Bj
1A ;
and hence, again neglecting terms in "4;
(1 + ")u0h + (1  ")u0l)
2
= u0 () + u00()
0@B1
!e
+
1 + "2
!e
nX
j=2
Cj 1Bj
1A
36
' u0 () + u00()
 
W +
1
!e
:
@
 
1 + "2
Pn
j=2Cj 1Bj
@"2
:"2
!
' u0 () + u00()  W +  W 2 +  @2"W  "2 :
Substituting this expression into (57) and using the value of
 
@2"W

in (56), we nd
rPV1 =   ln()  ln

+ (1  )u0 () + (1  )u00()

W +W 2"
2 +
W 2
+ (1  )u0()"
2

(58)
The linearisation of (58) around
 
W;W 2

= (0; 0) ; with W 2 = W   B1=!e = W   b1, gives
(26) in the body of the paper.
Let us now turn to the short yield. Under i.i.d. shocks, the average short yield is
rPV1 =  12
P
s=l;h lnC1z
s =   lnC1   ln(1 "
2)
2 : With "
2 small, we have   ln  1  "2 =2 ' "2=2;
while C1 is given by (54) and
 
@2"W

by (56)). This gives:
rPV1 '
"2
2
  ln   ln

+ (1  )u0() + (1  )u00()W + "2 + (1  )u
00()W 2
+ (1  )u0() "
2

Linearising the latter expression around
 
W;W 2

= 02, we obtain
rPV1 '   ln() +
"2
2
  ln  + (1  )u0() + "2
  (1  )u
00()W
+ (1  )u0() + "2  
(1  )u00()"2
[+ (1  )u0() + "2] [+ (1  )u0(])W 2: (59)
For small "2 small, this expression gives (27) in the body of the paper.
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